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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROCESS--STATE REGULATION OF BUSINESS
OF NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUAL AS BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
Defendant, a resident-citizen of Tennessee, was engaged in the termite
exterminating business in Mississippi. He maintained an office, of which
his agent had charge, in the city of Jackson. Plaintiff brought suit alleging
that the defendant had breached his contract with plaintiff to exterminate
termites and beetles, and served the Secretary of State of Mississippi pur-
suant to a statute authorizing such service when defendant is doing business
in, but is a non-resident of, the state.' As directed in the statute, the Secretary
of State sent a copy of the summons to the defendant by mail, and the clerk
who issued the summons also sent a copy by registered mail. Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the substi-
tuted-service statute violated Article IV, Section 2,2 and the Fourteenth
Amendment 3 of the Federal Constitution. From a decree of the lower court
sustaining the motion, the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the substituted service
statute, as applied to the defendant, is not unconstitutional, since defendant
is subject to state regulation under a license statute enacted to prevent "fraudu-
lent practices," 4 and the cause of action arose out of business transacted
within the state. Decree reversed. Condon v. Snipes, 38 So.2d 752 (Miss. 1949).
There are two issues to consider in substituted-service statutes: The
sufficiency of notice under the Due Process Clause and, the ppwer of a state,
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, to provide that the doing of
I. "Any non-resident, person, firm, partnership, general or limited, or any corpora-
tion not qualified under the constitution and laws of this state as to doing business
herein, who shall do any business in this state, shall, by the doing of such business or
the performing of such work or services, be deemed to have appointed the secretary
of state . . . to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of such non-resident, upon
whom process may be served in any action accrued or accruing from the doing of such
business . ., or as an incident thereto by any such non-resident, or his . . . agent, servant
or employee. The doing of such business or the engaging in any such work or service
in this state shall be deemed a signification of such non-resident's agreement, and
equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the secretary of state of the state
of Mississippi . . . to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of such non-resident
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding against such
non-resident for any cause of action which has accrued or may accrue in this state."
Miss. CoDn ANN. § 1437 (1942).
2. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several states."
3. Section 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction therof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. Miss, CODE ANN. §§ 5006-5011 (1942).
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business within a state by a non-resident constitutes the appointment of a
statutory agent for service of process.
The constitutionality, under tile Due Process Clause, of statutes providing
for service of process on a state official who mails a copy of the summons
to the defendant, has been upheld in cases involving tion-resident automobile
drivers 6 or owners,6 who were legally responsible for automobile accidents.
However, statutes which do not provide for notice to the non-resident defend-
ant by the state official are invalid as a denial of due process.
1 Actual notice
to the defendant is not required, if the substituted-service statute has a provi-
sion making it reasonably certain that the defendant will receive actual notice.,
These "automobile" cases are based on the theory that the use of automobiles
is attended by danger to the public; therefore the state may make regulations
applicable to non-residents in order to promote safety on the highways.
Since the state has power to regulate, under its police power, it has the
right, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. to exclude a driver until
he appoints a state official as agent for service of process.
9 The state may
declare that the use of the highway constitutes the appointment of a state
official as. agent upon whom process may be served.'
0
The "automobile" cases are usually cited for the proposition that a state
may exercise jurisdiction over non-residents doing an act 1t within the state.
By analogy, it would seem that a state may constitutionally exercise juris-
diction in actions in personam, over a non-resident doing business within a state.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized this analogy
on the case of Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman.
12 In that case, service
of process, pursuant to an Iowa statute, on a business agent of a non-resident
individual dealer in securities was upheld on the ground that Iowa treats
the business of dealing in corporate securities as an exceptional occupation
and subjects it to special regulation.
It is to be noted that the Iowa statute 1B in the Doherty case is somewhat
different from the Mississippi statute 14 in the principal case, in that: The
5. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927); Boss v. Irvine, 25 F. Supp. 983 (W. D.
Wash. 1939) ; Ray v. Richardson, 250 Ala. 705. 36 So.2d 89 (1948); Hendershot v.
Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N. E.2d 205 (1944).
6. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 (1933); cf. Morrow v. Asher, 55 F.2d 365 (N. D.
Tex. 1932).
7. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
10. Hess v. Pawloski, supra.
11. GoopRicn, CoNFLcT oF LAWS § 70 (2d ed. 1938).
12. 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
13. "When a corporation, company, or individual has, for the transaction of any
misi'S an office or agency in any county other than that in which the principal resides,
service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office or agency, in all
actions. growing out of or connected with the business of that office or agency." (italics
oursL IOWA COD1K § 11079 (1927).
14. See niote 1 sorpra.
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Iowa statute provides for service of process- on a business agent of the
defendant, while under the Mississippi statute service is to be made on a
statutory agent. Also, the Iowa statute is applicable to a resident or non-
resident individual who has an offici "in any county other than that in which
the principal resides," while the Mississippi statute seems designed to apply
only to non-residents and not to residents who have a principal office in one
county and a subsidiary office in another county within the same state. Hence
the Mississippi statute might be objectionable in that it discriminates against
non-residents. 15 This distinction between the two statutes is not mentioned
in the principal case.
The only other case which has considered the same Mississippi substituted-
service statute is the case of Sugg v. Hendrix.1 There, the non-resident
defendant was engaged in the occupation of constructing levees. A workman
who was injured while working on the project brought suit, service being
made in the same manner as in the principal case. The constitutional validity
of the statute was upheld on the ground that the state, under its police power,
"had the power to enact the statute.. . for the safety and protection of persons
receiving injury ... particularly when the nature of the work is fraught with
danger .. " The court in the principal case stated that since termite exter-
minating is a type of business which is subject to state regulation the substi-
tuted-service statute, as applied to the defendant, is constitutional.
It is to be noted that the "automobile" cases are based on statutes 17
specifically mentioning non-resident automobile owners or drivers, while the
Doherty v. Goodman case, the Sugg case, and the principal case are based on
statutes which apply to all who do business within the state but do not specify
any particular kind of business to which they are applicable, i.e., they appar-
ently are enacted in order to render non-residents amenable to service, in
actions in personam, no matter in what kind of business they are engaged.
However, the courts, in these cases, have expressly limited their opinions
to businesses which are subject to state regulation and have expressed no
opinion as to the constitutionality of the substituted-service statutes if applied
to businesses which are not subject to state regulation.1 s
15. See Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 701
(1932) ("It (statute) places no greater or different burden upon the non-resident than
upon the resident of the state. If an . . . individual resident in one county of this state
maintains an office or agency in another county of the state such . . . individual may be
sued under this statute in the latter county in actions in personam .... The latter (rerident-
citizen) may, under this statute, be compelled to defend a personal action in another
county far removed from the county of his residence.")
16. 142 F.2d 740 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
17. Eg., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 199 (1940); OHIO GEN. CODE A-r.N. §§ 6308-2,
6308-5 (1933); N. Y. VEHIcLE AND TPAFFic LAW § 59; TEx. STAT. REv. CiV. art.
2039a (1929).
18. It is increasingly difficult to find businesses which are not subject to state regu-
lation, hence the use of thege "substituted-service" statutes will probably increase in the
future.
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The constitutional power of a state to bind a non-resident individual
doing business within the state, by service of process upon a state official, or
business agent, regardless of whether or not the business is subject to state
regulation has been upheld in decisions rendered in the courts of New York, 19
Jowa,20 and Utah.2 I This view is supported by the opinions of many legal
writers.22 It is well established that a state may not discriminate against non-
residents by forbidding them ingress to engage in lawful businesses, 23 but
there seems to be no valid constitutional objection if the state imposes reason-
able conditions upon the non-residents doing business within the state which
render him as amenable to process as the resident business man.24 Equalization
of amenability to process can hardly be considered discriminatory.
With respect to the Due Process Clause, if the method of substituted-
service makes it reasonably certain that the defendant will be notified 25 and
given a reasonable time in which to appear and be heard,2 6 then all the require-
rients as to jurisdiction are met. Since the United States Supreme Court has
decided that substituted service in "autonobile" cases, and cases dealing with
businesses subject to state regulation. conforms to due process of law, there
can be no constitutional difference 2 in substituted service involving causes
of action accruing from continuous business transactions carried oii within
the state of the forum 5.2
19. Interchemical Cdrp. v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N. Y. S.2d 522 (lst
Dep't 1945).
20. Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., supra. But see, id at 705 (dissenting opinion).
21. Wein v. Crockett, 195 P.2d 222 (Utah 1948). But see. id at 231 (dissenting
opinion).
22. I)auni, The Trousaction of Business Within a State by a Nonresident as a
Foundatim for Jurisdictioj. 19 IowA L. lIZ'v. 421 (1934); O'Mellia, Jurisdietion by
Implied Consent. 29 MARQ. I.. REV. 31 (1945) ; Ross, The .hifting Basis of Jurisdiction,
17 MTN N. L. REV. 146 (193.3) ; Scott. Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doirw Business
Within a State. 32 HARv. I. Riw. 871 (1919) ; Notes, 40 Cni.. I. Raw. 1105 (1940), 33
Kv. L. 1. 316 (1945). ('ontraj: Rrsa i. CONFLt.IcT oF 1.,AWA § 83 (1934).
23. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281 (1920); Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall.
418 (U. S. 1871).
24. See note 22 su pro.
25. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928) ; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St.
112, 56 N. I.2d 205 (1944); Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386. 182 So. 427 (1938).
26. See Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 246 (1944) ("The
fundamental requirement of due process is an Ol)portulfity t ne heard upon such notice
and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right fur which the constitutional
protection is invoked. If that is preserved. the demands of due process are fulfilled.")
27. See Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 704
(1932) ("What difference is there, under the due process clause of the Federal Consti-
tution, between an action for damages for persnal injury and an action for damages for
fraud in the sale of stock . . . ? If jurisdiction can he obtained in one by substituted
service on an agent, certainly it can be ii the other. If anch service is due process in one
itstance. it cannot be anything else in the other. There is no question of police power in
either case. It is strictly and solely a question of due process of law.")
28. For a definition of "doing business within a state" under substituted service
statutes see Haire v. Mirabelli, suopra.
